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Abstract. This paper discusses the role of public investment in the determination of output 
growth from different theoretical and empirical points of view. The light is shed on the 
factors that allegedly explain the success and/or the failure of public investment policies in 
enhancing productivity and supporting GDP, based on a review of empirical evidence in 
advanced and developing economies. The downstream objective is to provide decision 
makers with a set of general rules-of-thumb that are likely to help them improve the 
macroeconomic returns of public investment. The latter are found to be significantly 
influenced by efficiency and profitability-based selectivity of investment projects. 
Countries with a relatively low capital-labor ratio usually have higher public and private 
capital profitability, while the public-private investment substitutability increases the 
likelihood of crowding out effects. The paper also gives hints on the possible existence of 
an optimal growth-maximizing level of public investment. 
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1. Introduction 
he concept of economic growth is still considered to be quite “modern”, or 
at least the great attention that has been given to its mechanisms and to the 
improvement of its pace. Yet, it is a phenomenon that had seen the light 
back in the 18
th
 century. According to several empirical studies, economic growth 
plays an important role in the shaping of the living standards of a given population. 
Differences between countries in terms of growth rates are shown to lead, if 
maintained over a long period of time, to noteworthy gaps in human welfare 
between their respective populations. Some authors demonstrated the latter 
statement through a comparison between the East Asian economies and the Sub-
Saharan African ones since the 1960s, i.e. more or less the end of the colonization
1
. 
The evident difference between these two sets of countries in terms of economic 
growth rates over the past decades and the respective average level of living 
standards has been used by some proponents of the Trickle Down theory in order to 
defend that economic growth actually “trickles down” to all the population, thereby 
contributing directly to the human development. Linking economic growth to –
human- development has also been the subject of an important number of research 
papers during the last four decades. As an example, Rosenberg & Birdzell (1986) 
defend that in the short run people have the tendency to believe that the gains from 
economic growth are experienced exclusively by the wealthy. However, both 
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authors explain that, in light of the accumulated economic growth through the 
twentieth century, working classes in developed countries were prospering and 
growing as a proportion of the whole population, as the incidence of poverty itself 
was reduced from 90 percent of the population to 20 percent more or less, 
depending on the country and on the definition criteria of poverty. 
This argument is confirmed by Crafts (2003), who illustrates the propitious 
impact of economic growth on human development by showing its correlation with 
life expectancy and how the latter contributes to the enhancement of living 
standards.  
It is important however to notice that demographic growth could blur the impact 
of economic growth on development, in the sense that an increase in GDP could be 
absorbed if matched with a proportional progression in the population. It is also 
possible to reach higher or lower per capita income through variations in the 
population. In this framework, Reynolds (1985) makes a distinction between 
extensive and intensive growth. The former is when GDP growth is fully absorbed 
by a demographic progression with no positive variation in per capita income; the 
intensive growth is when GDP growth is more important than population‟s 
expansion.  
As History shows, extensive growth had been predominant for centuries, as the 
large majority of the world population was bound to subsistence standards of living 
as economies allegedly kept moving forward. This finds explanation in the fact that 
possibilities for sustained intensive growth were particularly scarce in primary 
sector-based economies. According to Reynolds (1994), the availability and 
productivity of land determined the amount of extensive growth, but once the 
supply of suitable agricultural land was exhausted, decreasing incomes set in. This 
historical evidence provided contextual background to Robert Malthus‟s bleak 
prediction of an ineluctable long-run stationary state where nearly all humankind 
would be living on the strict minimum.  
As for the intensive form of growth, it took place only during a relatively short 
period of time
2 , and it is possible to make a distinction between “Smithian” 
intensive growth and “Promethian” one, mostly based on their level of 
sustainability. The former fits partially in the logic described above by Reynolds 
(ibid.), in the sense that the growth generated from productivity-enhancing resource 
reallocation, division of labor and trade, remains limited and the returns end up 
decreasing in fine. On the other hand, “Promethian” intensive growth, which is 
mainly driven by innovation and investment in new technologies, offers consistent 
elements of sustainability and provides larger perspectives of evolution for the 
economy. 
  In order to get more insight on the ins and outs of economic growth according 
to the literature, the first section of this paper discusses the main contributions of 
the Growth Theory School, which regroups several economists that dedicated the 
most part of their theoretical research to this particular topic. Then, we switch 
emphasis to the determinants of GDP growth, with a particular accent on the role 
of public investment as a potential growth-enhancing policy measure in light of 
various theoretical contributions and empirical evidence. The downstream aim is to 
assess the significance of public capital in influencing growth and to come up with 
general rules-of-thumb that, put together, could help explain any economy‟s 
likelihood of public investment macroeconomic returns. 
 
2. The Main Contributions of the Growth Theory  
One of the most influential contemporaneous schools that tackled the question 
of the ins and outs of economic growth and helped switch the research paradigm 
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regarding this matter is, without a doubt, the Growth Theory. According to the 
literature at this regard, growth theorists make the difference between proximate 
sources of growth and deep ones. The main variables that have been examined in 
the first category are capital and labor, as well as their accumulation and the 
degrees of their respective productivity, while the second category is mainly 
focused on the macroeconomic impact of technology, knowledge and innovation. 
In this framework, Rodrik (2003) argues that, when analyzing the accumulation of 
the aforementioned production factors in different countries, one cannot miss the 
significant disparities between the said countries regarding the amount of success 
in adopting new technologies, or simply in producing and accumulating the said 
production factors. Obviously, some economies have more advanced paces than 
others at this particular level
3
. 
In order to find explanation to these disparities, several growth theorists went 
beyond the proximate determinants. Economists like Rodrik (2003) and Temple 
(1999) focused on the deep (also said fundamental) causes of economic growth, 
which relate to those variables that lay influence on an economy‟s capacity to 
accumulate human and physical capital and to invest in the production of 
knowledge and innovation
4
. In this context, Temple (ibid.) argues that population 
growth, income distribution, trade regimes, the size of the government, but also the 
overall macroeconomic, political and social environments have a tangible impact. 
Analyzing the fundamental determinants of economic growth helped shift 
emphasis to the institutional aspects of a given economy. According to several 
World Bank reports, good governance and institutions represent a “crucial 
precondition for successful growth and development”. Moreover, Abramovitz 
(1986) drew attention to the determinant role of an economy‟s social capability 
when it comes to economic growth
5
. 
Some of these hypotheses, among other assumptions, were encompassed in 
integrated workhorse models in order to facilitate their assessment when it comes 
to economic implications. According to the literature, there are three main patterns 
of economic growth theory models. The first one to be ever created was the New 
Keynesian Harrod-Domar model, developed by the year 1948 by Roy Harrod and 
EvseyDomar. The emphasis was then significantly shifted toward the neoclassical 
framework in 1956, with the development of the Solow-Swan growth model. As a 
response to the theoretical and empirical insufficiencies observed in the 
neoclassical model, a type of models initially developed by Paul Romer and Robert 
Lucas, led the way toward the endogenous growth theory. 
2.1. The New Keynesian Harrod-Domar model 
The theories behind this model were separately developed by Harrod (1948) and 
Domar (1947). Their respective works aimed to assess the long-term dynamics of 
capitalist market economies, thus transcending the initial static Keynesian short-run 
paradigm. In his research, John Maynard Keynes argues that investment drives a 
significant impact on aggregate demand. Harrod and Domar, however, shed the 
light on the supply-side effect, namely how investment spending helps enhance the 
productive capacity of a given economy. 
The model is based on the assumption that the labor force growth rate is 
exogenous, and the capital-output ratio has an unchanged value (the technology is 
assumed to be fixed). Given an economy that encompasses only firms and 
households, and since national income (𝑌𝑡) would in this case equal consumption 
(𝐶𝑡) and saving (𝑆𝑡), we write: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡  
   In order for the economy to reach equilibrium, all saving must be invested. 
We write: 
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𝐼𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡  
 
   As a consequence, it would be possible to say that the national income (which 
represents also the GDP) equals consumption and investment: 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  
  Also, given that the capital stock is subject to a persistent depreciation (𝛿), 
while investment helps push it upward, it can be written as follows: 
 
𝐾𝑡+1 =  𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿. 𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  
Or    𝐾𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  
 
  As mentioned above, the capital-output ratio (
𝐾𝑡
𝑌𝑡
) is supposed to be fixed. This 
implies that the variations in these two variables are proportional, hence 
∆𝐾𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡
 is also 
fixed. We write: 
 
𝜑 =  
𝐾𝑡
𝑌𝑡
=
∆𝐾𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡
Therefore𝐾𝑡 = 𝜑. 𝑌𝑡  
 
  It is possible to say that total saving is a certain proportion (𝜏) of national 
income: 
 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡  
 
  If we take into account the aforementioned equilibrium condition, in which 
investment is strictly determined by saving: 
𝐾𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡  
 
  After replacing𝐾𝑡  and𝑆𝑡: 𝜑. 𝑌𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿 𝜑. 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡 = 𝜑. 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿. 𝜑. 𝑌𝑡 +
𝜏. 𝑌𝑡  
 
  When dividing both sides of this equation by𝜑 then moving 𝑌𝑡   to the left side: 
 
𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑡 =   𝜏 𝜑  − 𝛿 . 𝑌𝑡  
 
  Dividing by 𝑌𝑡gives us:  
[𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑡]
𝑌𝑡
 =  𝜏 𝜑  − 𝛿 
The left side of this final equation represents evidently the growth rate, which 
can be replaced for the sake of simplification by the letter G per example. Thus, 
according to the Harrod-Domar model, economic growth rate is tributary to the 
saving ratio  𝜏 divided by the capital-output ratio  𝜑 , minus the capital stock 
depreciation rate 𝛿. In other words, the more important the saving ratio and the 
lower is the depreciation rate and the proportion of capital compared to output, the 
higher is the growth rate. As for the depreciation rate, it was considered by both 
authors to be of no tangible influence on the economic growth and was not taken 
into account in several arguments after that. 
More saving implies more investment. The mainstay of the Harrod-Domar 
model is quite simple: more investment and relatively less capital accumulation in 
order to support GDP growth. Used in development economics research areas, the 
solution to underdevelopment would be to simply increase resources dedicated to 
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investment. And as the growth rate is positively correlated to the savings ratio in 
this model, several economists, such as Lewis (1954) and Rostow (1960), focused 
their research on the means of raising private savings ratios with the purpose of 
enabling underdeveloped countries to converge toward self-sustained growth. 
Following this paradigm, public fiscal policy was considered as a prominent tool 
according to development economics theorists during the 1950s, especially that a 
budgetary surplus can hypothetically substitute for private domestic savings. Some 
works also took into account the significant role of foreign aid when reducing the 
savings gap in developing countries. 
However, the main downside of the Harrod-Domar model is the fixity of the 
capital-output ratio, to which we refer above as𝜑. In principle, 
1
𝜑
 represents the 
productivity of investment; a fundamental concept when it comes to analyzing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the investment policy. Since the capital stock 
depreciation ratio influence on growth could be neglected, it is possible to state that 
GDP growth is tributary to the savings ratio multiplied by the productivity rate of 
investment. The latter variable should not be given. Moreover, according to Griffin 
(1970), the propitious effect of aid on investment was overrated; as a matter of fact, 
foreign inflows often led to a decrease in domestic savings alongside a decline in 
the productivity of investment. Nonetheless, this observation could not be assessed 
in the Harrod-Domarframework. 
Another shortcoming of this model is the hypothesis of zero substitutability 
between capital and labor, which can be deduced from the abovementioned 
exogenous aspect of the labor force growth rate and the fixed factor proportions 
production function. The latter reflects a rigid technology, and strictly limits the 
margin of fluctuation and evolution regarding this particular aspect, thereby 
making it quite difficult for the economy to reach equilibrium with full 
employment of both capital and labor. As mentioned before, the capital-output 
ratio𝜑 is assumed to be fixed, which implies that capital and output are bound to 
progress at the same pace in order to maintain equilibrium. It is worth noticing that 
Harrod and Domar also put forward the constancy of the capital-labor ratio
𝐾
𝐿
. This 
means that capital and labor must also increase at the same rate. Thus, if labor is 
supposed to follow the same rhythm of expansion as the population growth ∆𝑁𝑡 , 
then the sole way to maintain the economy at equilibrium is for the population 
growth rate to be the same as the economic growth rate: 
 
∆𝑁𝑡 =
[𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑡]
𝑌𝑡
 = 𝜏 𝜑  
(Here we neglect the impact of capital depreciation, as mentioned above) 
If population growth rate exceeds GDP‟s variation, unemployment would 
persistently increase, thereby generating disequilibrium in the labor market and, by 
extension, in the economy. And if it is underneath the economic growth rate, the 
capital stock would progressively decrease -in order to match the relative decline in 
labor, and the growth rate with it until ∆𝑁𝑡 = ∆𝑌𝑡 . Otherwise, if labor and capital 
do not grow at the same pace, the economy would lose its frail equilibrium. This 
element do not meet empirical evidence, which suggests that production factors 
progress in different rates and that technology changes can shift the economy into 
different settings of both factors without necessarily generating disequilibrium and 
confusion. 
In order to respond to the deficiencies of Harrod-Domar model regarding 
technology and the respective contribution of labor and capital to economic 
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growth, we discuss below some models that tackled these very questions in a more 
elaborate way. 
2.2. The Neoclassical Solow-Swan model 
Initially developed in the works of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), this model, 
best known as the Solow neoclassical model of economic growth, assesses the 
effect of saving, demographic growth and technology on GDP growth. It is based 
on several main assumptions, particularly the hypothesis that factor prices are 
flexible in the long term and respond to excess demand, which allows factor 
substitution by firms in response to changes in relative factor prices. Aggregating 
this response by firms across the economy would lead to changes in the factor 
proportions utilized in order to generate output
6
. 
So, in response to the deficiencies observed in the Harrod-Domar subsection, 
the neoclassical model considers the capital-output ratio
𝐾
𝑌
 and the capital-labor 
ratio
𝐾
𝐿
 to be flexible. And all the proportion of output that goes to saving is totally 
invested. It also considers the assumptions of full price flexibility and monetary 
neutrality, and GDP is supposed to be persistently at its potential level. Unlike the 
Harrod-Domar model, the Solow model is based on the existence of technological 
progress; its rate, as well as the capital stock depreciation‟s and the population 
growth are determined exogenously. And in order to simplify, the model takes into 
account an economy made of one sector and one type of product that can be used 
for both investment and consumption. 
According to Mankiw (1995), one of the strengths of Solow's version of the 
neoclassical growth model is that, despite its simplicity, it has many predictions. In 
evaluating the usefulness of the model in explaining growth experiences, it is worth 
stating namely: 1. In the long run, the economy approaches a steady state that is 
independent of initial conditions. 2. The steady-state level of income depends on 
the rates of saving and population growth. The higher is the rate of saving, the 
higher is the steady-state level of income per person; the higher the rate of 
population growth, the lower the steady-state level of income per person. 3. The 
steady-state rate of growth of income per person depends only on the rate of 
technological progress; it does not depend on the rates of saving and population 
growth. 4. In the steady state, the capital stock grows at the same rate as income, so 
the capital-output ratio is constant. 5. In the steady state, the marginal product of 
capital is constant, whereas the marginal product of labor grows at the rate of 
technological progress. These predictions are broadly consistent with experience
7
. 
Moreover, the simplicity of the neoclassical model, together with its ability to yield 
substantive and seemingly reasonable predictions, has given it a prominent place in 
the macroeconomist's toolbox
8
. 
The model tackles the proximate sources of growth and is built around three 
main functions, i.e. the production function, the consumption function and the 
capital accumulation process. The first one, based on the neoclassical aggregate 
production function, is written initially as follows: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾; 𝐿) 
 
One of the key hypotheses here is that when capital and/or labor increase, the 
marginal returns generated by this variation would be positive, but progressively 
diminishing. Besides, it is assumed that the higher is the capital-labor ratio
𝐾
𝐿
, the 
smaller becomes the marginal product of capital, and vice-versa. This finds 
explanation in the fact that, in an economy with a given level of technology, the 
capital-labor ratio would increase if there were, per se, more machines per worker. 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 3(1), Y. Oukhallou. p.71-99. 
77 
Subsequently, the output per worker/capita
𝑌
𝐿
 (i.e. labor productivity) would reach a 
higher level. On the other hand, as (marginal) returns tend to diminish, the effect 
driven by this capital accumulation per worker (per capita) on output would 
become thinner as
𝐾
𝐿
 keeps going upward. Accordingly, the impact of a certain 
progression in
𝐾
𝐿
 on
𝑌
𝐿
 is likely to be more important if capital is not relatively 
abundant. This observation led the proponents of the Solow model to defend that 
capital accumulation would have a larger impact on labor productivity in 
developing countries, as opposed to developed ones. Following this logic, in an 
open economy framework with no rigidities on capital mobility, capital is supposed 
to flow from developed countries to developing ones ceteris paribus. 
Expressed in a more elaborate way, income can be expressed as in: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝑡𝑓(𝐾; 𝐿) 
 
This could be written as follows, in the Cobb-Douglas version: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝑡 . 𝐾
∝. 𝐿𝛽  
 
Where ∝ and b are weigh parameters, reflecting the proportion of capital and 
labor in income; their sum usually equals 1
9
. This function, best known as the 
aggregate production function, is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, i.e. if 
capital and labor are raised by a certain rate, output would increase according to the 
same exact rate. The main hypothesis of constant returns to scale implies that the 
economy is advanced enough that there are no more possible Smithian gains from 
additional division of labor and specialization; hence, output per worker cannot be 
influenced by the size of the economy in terms of the labor force. As forAt , it 
represents technology, i.e. the way production factors are used in order to generate 
output. This variable is considered to be exogenous, depending basically on time. 
As defended by Solow (1956) and Mankiw (1995), among other neoclassical 
growth theorists, technology follows the same logic as a –free from charges- public 
good. If we consider the world economy, this would imply that all countries, 
despite their different levels of development, are allowed access to the same 
technology, ergo they are likely to follow the same production function. In other 
words, the neoclassical model of economic growth predicts that, in the long run, 
output per capita in all countries will grow at the same exogenously determined 
rate of technological progress. 
Several economists disagree with this assumption and insist that there are severe 
technology gaps between countries. Fagerberg (1994) argues that the only factor 
left within Solow‟s framework that can explain differences in per capita growth 
across countries is the “transitional dynamics”. Since initial conditions are 
generally different, economies may grow at different rates in the process towards 
long-term equilibrium. By the time said economies will reach this long-run 
equilibrium, disparities in terms of income would have narrowed down and 
eventually disappeared. This could be demonstrated through the abovementioned 
tendency for capital to flow from developed countries –where capital is abundant 
and its profitability is low, to developing ones –where the capital-labor ratio is low 
and capital profitability is at its best. This would result in a higher rate of capital 
accumulation and in a faster growth pace in the poor countries, as opposed to 
developed economies. However, Solow‟s model seems to have overlooked the 
interaction between capital accumulation and technological progress: according to 
several theorists, new technology is usually embodied in new capital goods
10
. 
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The second key component of Solow‟s model is the consumption function. As 
mentioned earlier, it is assumed that output per worker/capita
𝑌
𝐿
 is positively 
tributary to capital per worker/capita
𝐾
𝐿
. Based on this hypothesis, it is important to 
understand how the latter evolves over time, i.e. capital accumulation, which is 
largely determined by saving. As mentioned earlier in section 2.1, income –which 
equals output-, encompasses consumption and investment: 
  
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  
 
And since𝐼𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡  and𝑆𝑡 = 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡 , it is possible to write: 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡  
Thus 𝐶𝑡 =  1 − 𝜏 . 𝑌𝑡  
 
Capital accumulation plays an important role in the neoclassical framework of 
growth analysis. It constitutes the 3
rd
 key component of Solow‟s model, and is 
initially based on the hypothesis that capital stock is subject to a persistent 
depreciation (𝛿), while investment helps push it upward. As written in the previous 
section and in light of the other elements presented here: 
 
𝐾𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 + 𝑰𝒕 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 + 𝝉. 𝒀𝒕 =  𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿. 𝐾𝑡 + 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡  
𝐾𝑡+1 −  𝐾𝑡 = 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿. 𝐾𝑡  
 
In order to study capital accumulation in relation with labor, we subdivide both 
sides of the equation by L: 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐿
−
𝐾𝑡
𝐿
=
𝜏. 𝑌𝑡
𝐿
−
𝛿. 𝐾𝑡
𝐿
 
 
This last equation illustrates the principle according to which capital 
accumulation evolves through time. According to the literature, the fundamental 
differential equation of the Solow model in this framework is usually written as 
follows
11
: 
𝑘 = 𝜏𝑓 𝑘 − 𝛿. 𝑘  
 
Where 𝑘 =
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐿
−
𝐾𝑡
𝐿
is the variation of capital input per worker, and𝜏𝑓 𝑘 =
 
𝜏 .𝑌𝑡
𝐿
 represents saving (investment) per worker. As for  𝛿. 𝑘 =
𝛿 .𝐾𝑡
𝐿
, it represents the 
level of investment required in order for the capital-labor ratio to stay invariable. 
Solow‟s model takes into account the assumption that the labor force grows 
proportionally to the population growth rate  𝑛. Since 𝑘 =
𝐾𝑡
𝐿
an increase in the labor 
(e.g. due to a demographic expansion ∆𝑛) would drive a downward influence on 𝑘, 
just like capital depreciation do.  Ergo, the equation can simply become: 
 
𝑘 = 𝜏𝑓 𝑘 − (𝑛 + 𝛿). 𝑘  
 
The steady state, which has been discussed above, can then be expressed as: 
 
𝜏𝑓 𝑘∗ −  𝑛 + 𝛿 . 𝑘∗ = 0 
Thus:    𝜏𝑓 𝑘∗ =  𝑛 + 𝛿 . 𝑘∗ 
In a nutshell, the steady state is where saving (investment) can only cover the 
combined effect of population growth and capital depreciation per worker/capita, 
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in a way that the capital-labor ratio stays unchanged. According to the literature, 
when𝜏𝑓 𝑘  is larger than 𝑛 + 𝛿 . 𝑘 , the capital-labor ratio progresses, and vice 
versa. It is worth noticing that public finance could play a prominent role in 
influencing the course of capital accumulation, through the strengthening of𝜏𝑓 𝑘  
in this particular framework. 
If we apply the same logic here to the income equation 𝑌 = 𝐴𝑡 . 𝐾
∝. 𝐿𝛽 , we can 
write the equation below. Provided the hypothesis that returns to scale do not 
change, output per worker 
𝑌
𝐿
is not likely to be influenced by the scale level of 
output. In the Solow model, it is also assumed that for a given technology 𝐴0, the 
output-labor ratio
𝑌
𝐿
 is positively correlated to capital per worker
𝐾
𝐿
. 
 
𝑌
𝐿
=  𝐴0(𝐾
∝.
𝐿1−𝛼
𝐿
) =  𝐴0(𝐾
∝. 𝐿𝟏−𝛼 . 𝐿−𝟏)            As     𝛽 = 1 − 𝛼 
Then     
𝑌
𝐿
=  𝐴0(
𝐾
𝐿
)∝ 
 
If we take  𝑦 =
𝑌
𝐿
 and  𝑘 =
𝐾
𝐿
, the intensive form of the aggregate production 
function can be written as follows: 
 
𝑦 =  𝐴0(𝑘
∝) 
 
According to this equation, the higher is the capital per worker the more 
important is output growth per worker, provided that the economy remains at an 
exogenously determined level of technology. This finding, among other aspects 
mentioned above, suggests that capital-increasing fiscal policy is likely to improve 
GDP growth, on condition that demographic growth stays stable (ceteris paribus). 
However, this observation does not apply to long-run output growth. On the other 
hand, it is worth noticing that this equation exhibits diminishing returns on capital, 
i.e. the more important is capital accumulation the less marginal returns it 
generates. 
The Solow model gave a tremendous importance to technology as an 
explanatory variable that allows stronger output growth, by making it possible for a 
given economy to enhance its efficiency through different input combinations. 
Nevertheless, the fact that this key component of the neoclassical model of growth 
(i.e. technological progress) could not actually be explained by the model raised a 
significant wave of criticism. In an attempt to develop the model‟s structure, Arrow 
(1962) incorporated the “learning by doing” concept, which is supposedly at the 
origin of technological progress and productivity improvement. According to 
Arrow, experience uplifts labor‟s productivity; he argues that “technical change in 
general can be ascribed to experience, that it is the very activity of production 
which gives rise to problems for which favorable responses are selected over 
time”12. In a nutshell, experience is tributary to cumulative investment expenditures 
that have an effect on the work environment. 
As a whole, the Solow model has shown several deficiencies. One major 
shortcoming is the fact that long-run economic growth does not find satisfactory 
explanation in this model. As mentioned above, public economic policy can 
influence the level of output per capita/worker, whereas it has no effect on long-run 
GDP growth. Moreover, growth rate can only gather (or lose) pace temporarily 
during the aforementioned “transitional dynamics” toward a new steady state. 
However, sustained growth is still possible according to Solow‟s model, but only 
when there is technological progress. Then again, the only variable that could 
explain why there has been economic growth in world economies, i.e. technology, 
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is left outside the model as it was demonstrated in this section. This also narrows 
the interest toward this model regarding public long-run economic growth policy in 
general, and public investment in particular. 
To sum up, in the Solow neoclassical model of economic growth, capital 
accumulation is far from accounting for either continuous growth of output per 
capita in the long-run, or the tremendous gaps that can be noticed empirically 
between countries and geographical regions (even within the same country) in 
terms of welfare and living standards. 
Starting from the strengths of this model and as a response to its deficiencies, 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), followed by other growth theorists, developed an 
alternative model with a competitive framework where long-run economic growth 
is tributary to investment decisions rather than exogenously determined 
technological progress. The next section discusses the different findings in this 
framework. 
2.3. The Romer-Lucas endogenous growth model 
According to the aforementioned work of Arrow (1962), capital accumulation -
which is translated into technical changes that touch the work environment, 
generates positive externalities on knowledge and learning among the labor force. 
The endogenous growth model, as introduced by Paul Romer (1986) and 
completed by Lucas (1988), started from this finding and expanded the notion of 
capital to include research and development spending (R&D) and human capital 
formation, besides from the obvious physical capital. In this framework, capital 
accumulation has a significantly more important role in the economic growth 
process, as opposed to the neoclassical model. 
Here, knowledge is considered to have the characteristics of a public good since 
what the labor force learns in one firm is assumed to have a positive external effect 
on the production possibilities of other firms, because “knowledge cannot be 
perfectly patented or kept secret”13. Therefore, no firm can actually entirely 
internalize the propitious impact driven by their investment in physical and human 
capital on the stock of knowledge in the economy as a whole. 
Following this logic, technology is included in the production function as an 
endogenous variable: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐴) 
 
Unlike the neoclassical Solow model, this aggregate production function is 
assumed to exhibit increasing returns to scale, rather than constant ones. Another 
noteworthy difference is that Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) argue that returns to 
capital tend to progressively diminish, while the endogenous growth model does 
not. Moreover, the Romer-Lucas model supports the hypothesis that technology -or 
knowledge in general- is tributary to the growth of capital, since positive 
technological externalities are strengthened when there is an increase in the capital 
per worker ratio
𝐾
𝐿
 (capital deepening). Consequently, when K increases, it drives an 
upward influence on A, thereby uplifting the productivity of the economy as a 
whole according to the “learning by doing” logic as presented by the end of the 
previous subsection. In simpler words, economic growth is driven by investment, 
and the hypothesis of the nonexistence of diminishing returns to capital makes it 
possible for economic growth to sustain its pace as capital deepening takes place. 
In this case, the economy would fit in the Promethian type of growth, and would 
permanently increase its growth after each raise in the investment per GDP ratio. 
However, several economists criticized the model‟s findings based on the so-
called historical inconsistency of its core hypothesis, i.e. technology and 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 3(1), Y. Oukhallou. p.71-99. 
81 
knowledge as a free-from-charges public good. Empirical evidence shows that one 
of the most important problems that underdeveloped countries come up against is 
usually technology gaps. As a response to this wave of criticism, Romer (1990) 
enhanced his initial model based on three main premises. First, at the image of 
Solow‟s (1956) neoclassical model, it is assumed that technological progress 
(improvement in the production instructions for “mixing together raw materials”) 
lies at the heart of economic growth
14
. Technological progress motivates economic 
agents into continuous capital accumulation which, combined with technological 
progress itself, account for much of the increase in output per hour worked. The 
second premise is that technological progress is an endogenous variable since it is 
assumed to arise in large part as a consequence of intentional actions taken by 
people (e.g. economic agents, scientific researchers…) who respond to market 
incentives
15
. The third and most important premise is that once the cost of creating 
a new technology –and a new set of production instructions with it- has been 
incurred, the said technology can be put to use over and over again without any 
additional cost. Romer compares the development of new production instructions 
to incurring a fixed cost, which makes technology “inherently different” from other 
economic goods. In this framework, Romer admits that the benefits of 
knowledge/technology have to be at least partially excludable, in order to 
encourage the investment that is supposed to trigger such technological progress. 
Since the second premise states that technological progress arises in principle as a 
consequence of purposeful actions taken by economic agents who are self-
interested, the said progress must at least generate benefits that are motivating 
enough to these agents and which are supposed to be higher than what other people 
would generate afterward. Unlike public goods, which are non-rival and non-
excludable, knowledge is assumed to be only non-rival
16
. In other words, its use by 
a given firm does not technically stop others from using it, but said firm can 
prevent them via legislation and patent restrictions. 
Following this logic, the endogenous model of growth rejects the neoclassical 
hypothesis that considers technology to be a pure public good, hence accessible by 
everyone across the world without restrictions. Differences in incomes at the 
international level could be explained by differences in productivity, the latter 
being tributary to technology gaps, which are also known as “idea gaps”. This 
finding was confirmed by several economists, particularly Parente& Prescott 
(1999), who affirm that productivity gaps are due to the existence of barriers in the 
form of lobby-based high costs of entry which prevent economic agents in many 
developing economies from improving their respective technology and production 
process
17
. Subsequently, if the developing world‟s problem is rather idea gaps than 
object gaps (i.e. physical capital gaps), then it would be possible to stem the tide of 
income disparities and poverty in several countries simply via technological catch-
up, which would come at a relatively low cost. This perspective implies that 
economies that are isolated in terms of foreign economic exchanges are in effect 
raising barriers to the adoption of new technologies, thereby increasing their 
probability of having a lethargic GDP growth rate. A clear silver lining of 
economic openness is foreign direct investment (FDI), which can significantly 
facilitate the transmission of innovation and know-how, thereby boosting income 
growth. As a consequence, technological catch-ups can be made possible if 
developing countries at least encourage inward FDI flows and invest in human 
capital, in order for the workforce to be able to acquire and assimilate technological 
progress itself. 
In support to the importance of human capital, recent studies came up with the 
conclusion that investment in physical capital and in education play roughly similar 
roles in the determination of output, which implies that economic growth depends 
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roughly equally on the amount of physical capital and the amount of human capital 
in the economy
18
. Blanchard & Johnson (2013) say in this framework that countries 
that save more and spend more on education are likely to reach significantly higher 
steady-state rates of output per worker/capita. They explain that both forms of 
capital can be accumulated, the former through private and public physical 
investment, and the latter via education and training. According to these authors, 
there is a consensus among endogenous growth proponents regarding the fact that 
increasing either the saving rate or the fraction of output spent on education might 
lead to much higher levels of output per worker/capita in the long run. Nonetheless, 
seen the rate of technological progress, increasing education expenditures would 
not lead to a sustainably higher growth rate. 
From the elements developed in the three growth models, it is possible to read 
the importance of investment and capital accumulation in the improvement of 
economic growth, whether directly or through the facilitation of technological 
progress. In this context, it is most valuable to bear in mind that reducing 
restrictions to international trade is not enough to boost FDI flows and GDP 
growth; it could even generate reversed effects when the ground for such 
investments and the technology that comes along with them, are not satisfactory. 
Private investment in general, whether at the national scale or through FDI, is 
usually motivated by a ripple effect as regards to fiscal policy, particularly public 
investment. The latter provides in principle the required infrastructures regarding 
logistics, transport infrastructures, education and public health services, which are 
considered as sine qua non preliminary conditions for any investment in human or 
physical capital, hence for any progress in terms of economic growth and 
development. 
In order to deepen the discussion regarding the relation between growth and its 
determinants, we take this issue into an empirically founded level with practical 
cases of developed and developing countries in the sections below. But before 
doing so, we first make a swift emphasis on some further elements that could bring 
additional explanatory power over growth.  
2.4. Further determinants of economic growth  
According to the discussion above, three main growth factors can be identified, 
namely capital accumulation, human capital formation and technology/innovation. 
All three involve investment, respectively in physical capital, in education and 
knowledge, and in research and development (R&D).  
Stern (1991) goes beyond these elements and adds three other potential 
determinants of growth, i.e. organizational management, infrastructure and 
allocation of output across directly productive sectors
19
. According to the author, 
infrastructure deficits, together with a non-optimal management and economic 
organization, are likely to account for a significant part of low factor productivity 
in developing countries. He illustrates with the example of a private factory that 
works in an environment characterized by weak water and electricity supplies, 
unreliable transport infrastructures and expensive access to other logistics. It is 
important to note in this framework that, infrastructure spending constitutes the 
buckle of public investment. In this perspective, public infrastructure investment 
plays a crucial role in economic growth and development. Based on several studies 
laid by the World Bank, it is broadly accepted that infrastructure and GDP growth 
are linked by a more or less one-to-one correlation in developing countries, i.e. a 1 
percent rise in the infrastructure stock would lead to a 1 percent progression in 
output growth. 
As regards to the organizational factor of economic growth, well managed firms 
are supposedly likely to improve output by working with efficiency, and even in 
the case of a small capital-labor ratio -and thus allegedly strong incomes
20
, capital 
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can squarely be unproductive if combined with a weak organization. Moreover, 
Stern (ibid.) argues that a system where individuals behave dishonestly, where 
bureaucracy is obstructive, or where property rights are unclear may lead to a very 
wasteful allocation of resources in insuring against dishonesty, circumventing 
bureaucracy or enforcing property rights. The costs involved and the distortion of 
incentives in this framework might critically clog GDP growth
21
. 
Empirical studies provided evidence on the importance of the three factors Stern 
(ibid.) defends, besides from the ones presented by Solow (1956), Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (1988). A strong role in stimulating the growth process was assigned to 
both competition and government action by offering, for example, education and 
infrastructure
22
. Barro (1997) led a study in order to classify growth determinants 
in over 100 countries, which backed up and extended the broad lines of Stern‟s 
stipulations. Besides from the latter‟s three additional factors, Barro includes levels 
of education, fertility, inflation, government consumption, the rule-of-law, life 
expectancy and the terms of trade as factors that have a noticeable impact on GDP 
growth over “fairly long intervals” of time23. 
Furthermore, Abramovitz (1996) largely accepts technological progress as an 
eminent factor of growth, but partially links it to societal determinants, that he calls 
“social capability”. He argues that technological backwardness is not usually a 
“mere accident”. Tenacious societal characteristics normally account for an 
important portion of a country‟s past failure in achieving a level of productivity 
that is more or less equal to advanced economies‟, which could explain the 
persistent disparities in terms of output worldwide. The same deficiencies may also 
prevent developing countries from succeeding in the technological catch-up that is 
predicted in the Romer-Lucas framework. In a nutshell, Abramovitz defends that 
“a country‟s potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is backward without 
qualification, but rather when it is technologically backward but socially 
advanced” 24 . Education and economic organization play a crucial role in this 
context, as a trade-off between specialization and adaptability becomes decisive. 
The notion of adaptability suggests that there is an interaction between social 
capability and technological opportunity. The state of education embodied in a 
nation‟s population and its existing institutional arrangements has the tendency to 
hold back the economic agents in their choices of technology. It is, however, 
technological opportunity that encourages said economic agents to do additional –
adaptation- efforts in order to enable the transition toward a new technology. Here, 
technological opportunity is usually materialized into a stronger income growth, 
whether as the consequence of a direct impact or via the increase of 
competitiveness at the international scale.  
In effect, Abramovitz (1986) argues that an economy‟s “potentiality” for 
productivity advance through catch-up is actually defined by the combination of 
technological gap and social capability. Economies that are technologically 
backward have a potentiality for generating faster economic growth rates than 
more advanced ones, but only provided their social capabilities are sufficiently 
developed to enable successful exploitation of cutting edge technologies that are 
already in use in developed countries. The rhythm at which potential for 
technological catch-up is actually realized in a given period of time is tributary to 
factors limiting (or promoting) the diffusion of knowledge, the rate of structural 
change, capital accumulation and the expansion of the demand for new technology-
based products. And as discussed in section 2.3, investment plays an important 
role, especially FDI which can significantly facilitate the transmission of 
innovation and knowledge, thereby boosting GDP growth. As a consequence, 
technological catch-up can be made possible if developing economies at least 
encourage inward FDI flows and invest in human capital, in order for the 
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workforce to be able to acquire and assimilate technological progress itself. In this 
framework, needless to remind ourselves that FDI is usually driven by public 
economic policy, mostly through the existence of satisfactory social and physical 
infrastructures regarding logistics, transport infrastructures, education and public 
health services etc., besides from fiscal and tax incitements. Institutional 
infrastructures are also noteworthy (i.e. democracy, human rights and a relatively 
impartial justice system); they provide the country with political and social 
stability.  
The free flow of FDI –and technology along with it, from advanced to 
developing countries can be highly dissuaded by the risk involved in investing in 
economies that suffer from macroeconomic volatility, trade barriers, insufficient 
infrastructure, weak level of education, social and political instability, and 
corruption. This having been said, theorists defend that proximate causes of growth 
are not enough to deepen the analysis and that one should also look into the larger 
fundamental determinants. Explaining growth “miracles” and “disasters” requires 
an understanding of the history of the economies being investigated as well as how 
policy choices are made within an institutional structure involving political 
distortions
25
. 
As a response to this necessity, the next section provides a discussion of several 
empirical studies regarding the very cases of some advanced and developing 
countries. The emphasis is laid in general on the empirically founded determinants 
of output growth; but out of relevance to the present paper, the choice of giving 
most attention to the influence of public investment was made. The analysis aims 
to assess the significance of the latter and to come up with transversal 
characteristics and rules-of-thumb that, put together, could help explain any 
economy‟s likelihood of –public- investment macroeconomic returns.  
 
3. An Analysis of the Empirical Studies  
This section reviews the main findings of empirical studies that had tackled the 
question of economic growth, its determinants and the role of public investment as 
a potential growth-enhancing policy measure. The analysis starts with general 
cases, mostly in advanced countries, before narrowing down the focus to discuss 
the case of middle-income countries. 
As discussed in subsection 1.1.2, investment plays a decisive role in the sense 
that it enhances the capacity of production factors‟ inputs, particularly by driving 
an upward influence on technology and education, among other physical and 
societal variables. It is placed as a transversal determinant of growth. Even in the 
learning by doing process introduced by Arrow (1962), what is described as 
experience is tributary to investment expenditures that have an effect on the work 
environment. However, it is important to make allowances between private and 
public investment. Based on empirical studies, several eminent economists argue 
that the latter should be included in a production function as a separate variable 
from the overall investment, since private investment is not likely to be a substitute 
of public capital, particularly when it comes to providing public goods and 
services. Public investment is even considered to be an input to private 
production
26
. This argument is endorsed by the literature, where it is largely 
accepted that public investment is predominant when it comes to infrastructure 
expenditures and projects, as opposed to private capital. Hirschman (1958) and 
Biehl (1991) define infrastructure itself as the part of the overall investment that 
provides public services. Furthermore, the government‟s role in public investment 
is not limited to its own budgetary spending. The case of public-private 
partnerships (PPP) is a striking example of infrastructure projects where the biggest 
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part of investment spending is supposed to be made by private companies. Yet the 
purpose of these expenditures would be to provide goods or services for which 
there is justified public involvement. And the government‟s role in relation to the 
PPP arrangement, e.g. monitoring, regulation and risk bearing, remains quite 
important. Similarly, in cases where the private sector invests in the production of 
goods characterized by natural monopoly conditions, government regulatory 
involvement is called for. In other spheres of private investment, a government 
regulatory or planning role may also be fundamental in order to take account of 
public policy objectives (in the case of externalities), though such investments 
would still be recognized as private
27
. 
Beyond the canonical crowding in/crowding out effects of government 
spending, the debate regarding the impact of public investment on economic 
growth was revived by an empirical research led by Aschauer (1989), where the 
emphasis was laid on the productivity growth generated by non-military public 
investment in the United States. He came up with the conclusion that investment in 
infrastructure has a really strong positive influence on private firms‟ productivity, 
as the post-1970 productivity decrease was found to be the result of the drop in 
public investment in the US. This finding was remotely supported by the high 
growth rates in Asian economies during the 1990s, which were linked to their 
tremendous public investment rates. Nevertheless, the causality here –and even the 
correlation sign in some studies- remained subject to controversy, as explored 
below in this section. Besides from divergences between researchers regarding the 
econometrical aspects and their outcome, it is possible to say that the persistent 
debate might also be explained by the fact that a considerable part of public 
investment is spent on the government‟s transversal functions, e.g. law and order 
enforcement, provision of social and public services, administration etc. Therefore, 
it is difficult to assess its impact on productivity and economic growth, since it 
would only indirectly affect them. This difficulty exists even when it comes to 
infrastructure investment expenditures, because the latter‟s impact on productivity 
takes a long time to be recognizable and the risk of losing track becomes quite 
important, which complicates the data assessment even more. 
Usually, available data for this purpose consists of both national-level evidence 
and investment-specific evidence. The former consists in time series data on public 
investment expenditures while the latter tackles the economic impact of each 
specific investment project. Lack of coverage has always been a major difficulty in 
this framework, besides from the fact that developing countries –and even some 
developed ones- rarely keep track of the economic performances of their 
investment expenditures over time. Warner (2014) sums up this particular situation 
as follows: “Research in this area is bedeviled by the fact that governments that 
implement major public investment drives frequently leave no hard data behind on 
the impact of their investments; and governments that collect good data frequently 
do not attempt major investment drives”28. Subsequently, researchers are obliged to 
use estimates and, in most cases, to go along with how the national authorities 
differentiate public investment expenditure from public consumption spending. 
The difference between both types could be hazy, to some extent. For example, 
education expenditures are usually not considered to be public investment. Yet, 
even though the definitions are not unanimous across countries, there is a large 
consensus regarding expenditures that touch logistics, roads and power 
infrastructure which are treated as capital goods. 
In order to discuss these elements, among other significant findings, section 3.1 
starts by reviewing the empirical debate regarding public investment among the 
determinants of economic growth in advanced countries. Then, in section 3.2 the 
light is shed on this question, but in the very case of developing countries in order 
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to set a relevant benchmark and to come up with a sound rule-of-thumb that, put 
together, could help explain any economy‟s likelihood of –public- investment 
macroeconomic returns. 
3.1. The case of developed countries 
As briefly underlined above, one of the most influential research papers 
regarding the determinants of growth and the macroeconomic impact of public 
investment is Aschauer‟s (1989), in a sense that it revived the research in this area, 
in particular regarding developed countries. At the moment when economists were 
attempting to explain why productivity dropped in the United States, Aschauer 
provided based on a Cobb-Douglas econometrical model, a seemingly logical 
explanation, i.e. the decline of private and public investments
29
. Nevertheless, the 
findings were taken with much caution after acerbic criticisms regarding the 
modeling methodology. As a matter of fact, the non-stationarity of the data used in 
Aschauer‟s work was undoubtedly a significant problem, but also the assumption 
that production factors are purely exogenous, which implies that there would be no 
room whatsoever for a potential influence of output itself on private and public 
capital. However, empirical evidence visibly suggests that there is a back and forth 
connection between GDP growth and investment.  
Sturn& De Haan (1995) revisited the results found by Aschauer (1989) and 
ended up with a different conclusion using the same data but more modern 
econometrical techniques. Based on their assessment of the data, it turned out that 
the variables in the production function were supposed to be estimated in first 
differences, as opposed to in levels regression used by Aschauer. One of their main 
conclusions is that the positive relation between public investment and GDP 
discovered by Aschauer had been overvalued
30
.  A research paper made by Barth & 
Bradley (1987) -and which had not caught as much attention as Aschauer‟s even 
though it was prior to it- found, for the case of 16 OECD countries, that the share 
of investment in GDP had a statistically insignificant effect on growth, although 
the sign of the correlation was positive. 
Also based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, Barro (1990) formally 
considered government (consumption and investment) expenditures to be 
endogenous, and provided an insight on the potential relation between the size of 
the government and the economic growth rate. He concluded that the share of 
productive government spending (e.g. public investment expenditures) that 
maximizes GDP growth is smaller if the government is also using the income tax to 
finance other less productive types of spending. In other words, an increase in 
resources dedicated to non-productive government services is likely to generate 
lower per capita growth
31
. Therefore, Barro (1990) partially joined the conclusions 
of the former work of Kormendi&Meguire (1985) who found, based on a sample of 
47 countries in the post WW II period, that there is no significant relation between 
average real GDP growth rates and average government consumption. This last 
paper did not, however, tackle government spending from a productivity-enhancing 
public investment perspective. As for Mankiw (1995), he sums up the buckle of 
empirical studies, stating that the share of output allocated to investment is 
positively associated with growth, as well as a certain number of measures 
concerning human capital, such as enrollment rates in primary and secondary 
schools. Milbourneet al. (2003) investigates whether there is a distinct role for 
public investment as a determinant of GDP growth. In order to neutralize the 
potential effect of demographic growth, they consider output per capita. The latter 
does not seem to be influenced in a noticeable way by public investment in the 
steady state equilibrium. However, the impact is found to be substantial during the 
periods of transition toward steady state
32
. 
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Whereas, the models based on the production function or the cost function, 
were proven to have a noteworthy drawback, i.e. they can only analyze the effects 
of public spending that “transit” through private sector production. However, many 
government consumption or transfer items can have important macroeconomic 
effects even if they have no noticeable impact on private sector production or cost 
functions
33
.  
With the aim of addressing such particular issues, the introduction of the VAR 
approach by Sims (1980) enabled economists to empirically assess the influence of 
public and private investment on output growth without any pre-established 
theoretical restrictions. One of the most valuable contributions of Sims is the 
possibility to examine causality directions between all variables. This contribution 
largely responds to the abovementioned criticism regarding Aschauer‟s (1989) one-
way-causality econometrical methodology. However, VAR‟s perks are limited by 
some deficiencies, particularly the fact that it demands larger data samples in order 
to apply lag lengths. This often narrows the possibilities for researchers due to the 
lack of long series data, especially regarding variables that only have annual 
frequency, e.g. public capital stock. 
Using VAR methodology, Mittnik& Neumann (2001) analyzed the interactions 
between GDP, private investment and public (investment and consumption) 
expenditures in the case of six advanced economies. Their conclusion corroborated 
some of Aschauer‟s findings as regards to the significant positive effect of public 
investment as a determinant of GDP growth in the short run with a smaller 
influence in the long run, except for Germany where the effect remains significant. 
Furthermore, Mittnik and Neumann‟s (2001) results dismissed the existence of 
public investment crowding out effects. This last conclusion was contested by Voss 
(2002), who argues that innovations to public investment crowd out private 
investment, based on a VAR model that encompasses GDP, private investment, 
public investments, and the real interest rate for the cases of Canada and the United 
States from 1947 to 1996. 
As for Perotti (2004), he led a study based on a quarterly VAR model with a 
sample that includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and 
Germany. In order to improve the accuracy of his model, Perotti subtracted 
government investment for defense purposes from public investment and added it 
to government consumption, since defense machinery and equipment do not touch 
the conventional structures of the economy and are not likely to drive a ripple 
effect on private sector investment. However, the paper‟s result is quite difficult to 
reconcile with the studies mentioned above, among many others. Output and 
private investment were found to react more significantly to government 
consumption shocks, than to public investment. Perotti explains this puzzle by the 
fact that the aforementioned advanced countries might have too much public 
capital relative to their optimal level, so that public investment could have a very 
low, or even negative, marginal product. There is also a plausible hypothesis, i.e. 
public investment might be particularly prone to political pressure, and loaded with 
pork-barrel projects with no economic rationale; if it crowds out more productive 
private investment, it can show up as having a negative multiplier after the general 
equilibrium effects are played out
34
. Besides, Perotti argues that some types of 
transfers and government consumption also have important, if less obvious, 
positive externalities in the long run; for instance, some models of growth imply 
that under some conditions, transfers might release credit constraints and therefore 
promote investment in education and growth. Bottom line is: the paper provided 
evidence suggesting that the reputation given to public investment as a determinant 
of GDP growth is “probably undeserved”.  
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The first explanation given by Perotti (2004) was corroborated by Kamps 
(2004) for the case of Japan, where public investment shocks seem to drive a 
downward influence on economic growth. Among the 22 OECD countries 
examined by Kamps, Japan is the country that exhibits by far the most important 
public capital to output ratio, which makes plausible the assumption that the said 
ratio in Japan is beyond its optimal level so any further public capital would have 
an unfavorable effect on GDP, hence the negative marginal productivity of public 
investment. However, Kamps‟ model contradicts itself if one follows only this 
particular logic. Portugal, which shows the lowest public capital to output ratio, 
also exhibits a negative marginal productivity of public capital, while the other 
countries in the sample have a larger ratio but still a positive macroeconomic effect 
of public investment
35
. As a response to this contradiction, the author brings up 
another possible explanation, i.e. public capital could simply crowd out private 
capital and employment
36
. 
On a remotely different register, Gonand (2007) links the extent of public 
investment‟s impact on the economy to the existence of qualified labor force. 
Gonand focuses mainly on public investment in human capital, and underlines the 
substantial long-term impact on GDP of efficiency gains in public spending in 
education. According to his study, a 10 percent increase on educational output 
might raise GDP by an estimated 3 to 6 percent in the long run in most OECD 
countries. Following this logic, the public budget spent on education in the 25 EU 
members jumped from 4.7 percent to 5.2 percent in the 2000-2003 period, 
according to Eurostat data. 
When analyzing the efficiency of public investment spending as regards to both 
its required financial resources and its economic impact, Afonsoet al (2005) built a 
public sector efficiency composite indicator for 23 advanced OECD economies, 
which includes information on administration, education, health (life expectancy, 
infant mortality), income distribution, economic stability and economic 
performance outcomes. The latter is assessed through the variations among a 10 
year average unemployment rate. Their main conclusion is that higher public 
investment expenditures are associated with diminishing marginal returns, which is 
in line with the elements discussed above in section 2.2. Furthermore, the authors 
here argue that countries with “small” public sectors (i.e. with public spending that 
is below 40 percent of GDP) on average have a more efficient provision of public 
services and a therefore a stronger macroeconomic impact
37
. 
Following the discussion in this section as a whole, it is possible to presume that 
an important part of the empirical literature tends to corroborate the existence of an 
upward effect of public investment when it comes to economic growth, in 
developed countries in this case. Nonetheless, research papers such as Perotti‟s 
(2004), Kamps‟ (2004) or Barro‟s (1990) question the effectiveness of public 
capital as a potential determinant of GDP growth. They generally support -based 
on empirical evidence- that an insignificant or negative multiplier of government 
investment goes alongside the existence of a large public capital per capita. 
Subsequently, some of the findings could probably not be extended to developing 
countries, which are characterized by low GDP and allegedly low public capital per 
capita. 
The next section reviews some of the empirical studies that tackled the very 
question of public investment as a determinant of GDP growth in developing 
countries. The objective is to assess the validity of the aforementioned hypothesis, 
as low and middle income economies often have a low capital to GDP ratio. 
3.2. Case of small and middle income countries 
In the case of developing countries, where the infrastructure level is usually 
suboptimal and –in some sectors- nonexistent, the necessity for substantial public 
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investment expenditures in order to promote both economic growth and 
development would merely be common sense. However, even among this category 
of countries, the significance of the impact of public capital on the economic 
activity is subject to a large empirical debate, since it remains tributary to several 
factors (e.g. governance, political stability, the relative dynamism of private 
investment…), as some concepts such as efficiency and optimality start to play a 
decisive role in the process. 
One of the research papers that examined the largest samples of developing 
countries is Khan‟s (1996), which explored the relative importance of public and 
private investment in promoting economic growth for 95 developing countries 
using two stage least squares (TSLS) and panel data methods. The author found out 
that private and public investments have a differential impact on economic growth, 
with private investment having a much more significant macroeconomic influence 
than public investment. Nevertheless, Khan argues that the government can play a 
critical part in the process by identifying much more rigorously the types of 
investment that have positive net returns and are likely to be complementary to the 
private sector. In other words, this research subtly calls for the implementation of 
concepts such as efficiency and selectivity based on the size of investment and its 
expected returns. Public investments that do not meet these criteria would most 
likely appear to have a downward influence on GDP growth and factor 
productivity, and thus should be cut or not undertaken
38
. Khan‟s main finding was 
roughly corroborated by Ghani& Din (2006) who concluded, based on an analysis 
of the Pakistani framework, that growth is largely driven by private investment and 
that no strong inference can be made about the effects of public investment and 
public consumption on economic growth. However, they found that public 
investment has a negative -though insignificant- impact on output, which “raises 
some concern about the efficiency of public investment” in Pakistan39. Based on 
these two different research papers, it is possible to connect the dots and think of a 
plausible explanation for the relatively weak macroeconomic effect of public 
investment, i.e. when further public spending do not follow efficiency and 
profitability-based selectivity, its marginal productivity is likely to shrink as the 
crowding-out effect stays at a certain level. By the end of the process, the allegedly 
positive effect of public investment on output would have been partially or totally 
neutralized by the negative macroeconomic impact of crowding-out. 
The assumption of the existence of crowding out effect in developing countries 
was challenged by a book published the same year as Khan‟s (1996) paper, i.e. 
Agénor&Montiel (1996). The latter authors argue that in the case of small and 
middle income countries, government budget deficits tend to have a negligible 
influence on interest rates; hence the crowding out effect would be of an 
insignificant magnitude. Moreover, public investment is supposed to provide 
developing countries with the lacking infrastructures regarding logistics, 
transportation, education and public health services, which are considered as sine 
qua non preliminary conditions for any private investment in human or physical 
capital, hence it is supposed to be non-substitutable and to uplift economic growth 
and development. In other words, public investment is likely to have a larger 
macroeconomic effect in the developing world compared to advanced economies, 
since there is a more important margin of improvement at the infrastructure level, 
among other development and economic variables. In this context, the public 
investment multiplier effect is found to go up to 1.4 in middle income countries 
while it is weak –and even negative in some cases- in advanced economies, 
according to an empirical survey made by Hemming et al (2002). They explain this 
finding by the fact that crowding out is strong when government spending 
substitutes for private spending or when the interest rate and the exchange rate rise 
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in response to fiscal expansion. This generally does not apply to developing 
countries, since most of them have fixed exchange rate and public spending, 
particularly public investment, tackles essentially the existing infrastructure issues, 
hence its non-substitutability as regards to private investment. The paper also links 
crowding out to the predominance of Ricardian households in the economy, in 
which case a permanent fiscal expansion would reduce the demand, particularly 
consumption
40
.  
Based on these elements, among others, Hemming et al (2002) conclude that 
crowding out is more likely to take place in developed economies, not in 
developing ones. In a more recent study, Swaby (2007) contested this finding in a 
research paper that discusses the interaction of public investment and GDP growth 
in Jamaica using a VECM method, based on 1994-2006 data. The paper‟s results 
show that public investment considerably crowds out net private investment, while 
only a weak relationship between output and public investment has been detected. 
Furthermore, the Granger causality result suggests that public investment does not 
cause GDP growth; however, reverse causality could not be convincingly rejected. 
Swaby‟s VECM results join Khan‟s (1996) when it comes to the importance of 
private investment as a determinant of economic growth: it was found that 
domestic private sector investment and FDI have a positive direct impact on the 
level of GDP in the long-run
41
. 
China, during its development phases, also constitutes an interesting case to 
investigate. An empirical research led by Chow (1993) tackled the role of capital 
stock variations in determining the Chinese GDP growth. Besides from the fact that 
it enables to discover China‟s investment policy by the time it upgraded to the 
status of emergent economy, the particularity of this study lies in the disaggregated 
analysis regarding agriculture, industry, services and construction. The sectors 
where public and private investment had been the most productive were 
construction (a 26 percent rate of return to capital), agriculture (20 percent) and 
industry (17 percent). Moreover, Chow (1993) discovered that in the period from 
1952 to 1985, the Chinese average income growth rate went alongside the capital 
growth rate, respectively 6 percent and 7.6 percent. 
The concept of public investment optimality was motivated by Fosuet al (2011), 
who used a panel data from 33 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 
from 1967 to 2008 in order to assess the relationship between public investment, 
private investment and economic growth. The results indicated that not only does 
public investment play a crucial role in determining economic growth, but also that 
its current level in Sub-Saharan economies is, on average, sub-optimal
42
. The paper 
went further and tried to identify the growth-maximizing level of public 
investment. The latter level was found to fluctuate between 8.4 percent and 11 
percent of GDP depending on the country, but also on the econometric technique 
used. This finding does not diverge quite much from a study made before by Miller 
&Stoukis (2001) and in which the results exhibit a public investment  “optimal” 
level of 18 percent of GDP, for a different set of low and middle income 
economies
43
. 
A certain number of research papers investigated the relationship between 
public –and private- investment and economic performances, but for specific Sub-
Saharan African countries using different econometrical methods. Their findings, 
however, do converge considerably. For example, Bédia (2007) examined the case 
of Ivory Coast during the period from 1969 to 2001, using an error correction 
model and an autoregressive-distributed lag methodology. The paper shows that in 
the short run, a 100 percent increase in public investment leads to a 7 percent rise 
in real GDP. The impact is even larger in the long run, going up to a 37 percent 
increase in real output. This finding diverges from Khan‟s (1996) and Ghani& 
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Din‟s (2006) in their respective samples, especially that public investment is found 
to have a larger effect on economic growth compared to private capital shocks. On 
the other hand, Bédia (ibid.) raises the question of public investment inefficiency in 
Ivory Coast in the short run; however, one should bear in mind that public 
investment usually generates returns only after a relatively long period of time, 
since it generally handles long term structural issues, as opposed to private 
investment. 
In Northern Africa, the Tunisian case regarding the particular contribution of 
private and public investment to economic growth has been subject to several 
studies. Casero&Varoudakis (2004) examined the significance of each factor‟s 
contribution to average GDP growth in Tunisia from 1970 to 1999, in comparison 
to five fast growing countries, i.e. Chile, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius and Thailand. 
The study takes into consideration public investment, private investment, the 
macroeconomic stability, the structural reform in trade and finance, the human 
capital, and the convergence effect
44
. The results indicate that as opposed to the 
five aforementioned fast growing economies, Tunisia‟s GDP growth relied more 
on public investment, and less on private investment and human capital. The 
authors defend that it would be unrealistic to assume that public investment will 
continue to be a main driver of growth in Tunisia in the near future. They explain 
this predictive hypothesis by the fact that the margin for maneuver to raise public 
investment is narrowing down, as the size of non-discretionary public expenditures 
is growing bigger and given the need to consolidate and rationalize Tunisian fiscal 
policy
45
.  
These arguments are endorsed by Achy (2011), who laid emphasis on the fact 
that Tunisia‟s excessive level of public debt is likely to only weaken investors‟ 
confidence and trim down growth prospects. Subsequently, it would be capital to 
promote the private sector development, particularly by removing inefficient 
regulations and fighting corruption
46
. Nevertheless, a study made by Boughzalaet 
al (2007) regarding regional economic growth and development in Tunisia had 
reached the conclusion that public capital is an essential determinant of economic 
growth and that it plays a crucial role in the reduction of poverty, therefore it 
should not be cut down. Based on a dynamic and regionalized computable general 
equilibrium model (CEGM), the authors discovered that the Tunisian regions and 
areas where there is the least public investment spending have substantial 
development deficiencies and show a distorted income distribution and high rates 
of poverty, as opposed to regions where the state invests more. One should bear in 
mind that based on the literature we have been discussing so far, public investment 
(among other instruments of fiscal policy) is hypothetically supposed to help drain 
private investment to a given region or country by providing infrastructures etc., 
provided that the public-private investment complementariness is ascertained. In 
this framework, IMF (2014a) recommends for Tunisia a gradual replacement of 
generalized subsidies with a better-targeted compensation system, and the control 
of the wage bill, which would free up budget resources for higher social 
expenditures and growth-supporting public investments over the medium term
47
. 
These recommendations are quite similar to the reforms suggested by the IMF for 
the cases of other MENA countries, such as Morocco. 
Following IMF‟s doctrine and based on several other reports regarding middle 
and low revenue countries, public investment and social programs are in principle 
seen to be important to promote growth. The issue is in defining which sectors are 
the most economically reactive to public investment, and the extent to which 
certain types of public project management are best in order to improve efficiency 
regarding some specific public investment expenditures, but also the public 
projects that are likely to encourage and drive further private capital. On the other 
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hand, fiscal policy makers would usually face a tradeoff between investing and 
maintaining debt in a sustainable level.  
Several studies concerning the Turkish economy discuss this very issue. As 
opposed to the predictions and recommendations made by Casero&Varoudakis 
(2004) regarding the Tunisian public investment trends, the case of Turkey exhibits 
a squarely detrimental impact of the retrenchment of public capital. Ismihanet al 
(2002) argue that when the government cuts down public investment –especially 
infrastructural expenditures- instead of current and “populist” spending, capital 
accumulation, economic growth and development suffer from a severe regression 
in Turkey. Hence, in order to satisfy the public finance stability constraint, fiscal 
decision makers have to choose carefully which components of public expenditures 
should bear the burden of fiscal adjustments such as the ones motivated above by 
the IMF
48
. Their study indicates that capital accumulation is the main factor behind 
Turkey's growth performance, and that private investment‟s response to public 
investment shocks is quite large, which gives even further importance to public 
capital from a macroeconomic point of view. And as the post-1980 macroeconomic 
instability in Turkey resulted in the reduction of public investment, particularly in 
infrastructure projects, the relative proportion dedicated to current public spending 
increased which reversed the complementariness between public investment and 
private investment. The existence of a relatively significant long-run crowding out 
effect of the overall public investment on private investment is most probably 
tributary to the waning of this very complementariness, as even post-2002 data 
exhibits no long-run correlation between the two. 
Arslan&Saglam (2011) went further in their analysis of the Turkish framework 
by introducing corruption. They basically argue that corruption affects investment, 
and particularly public investment, which is reflected on the economic 
performances. The authors explain this chain of causality based on the fact that 
corruption supposedly distorts the decision making process regarding public 
investment projects and is likely to influence both the size and the composition of 
the overall public investment. In other words, corruption would increase the 
number of projects carried out by the government and alter the design of said 
projects, mostly by extending their sizes and their complexity. Subsequently, the 
part of public investment in GDP would increase as its marginal productivity 
would drop, which would trim down the output growth
49
. Despite the fact that their 
empirical results do not fully support their thesis, as they turned out to be 
insignificant, the study led by Arslan&Saglam (2011) can fit in the line of several 
research papers regarding this very issue in different countries, such as Bardhan 
(1997) and Mauro (1996;2004). And the analysis carried by these authors 
motivates the notion of efficiency through the reduction of corruption. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
In this paper, the light was shed on economic growth as a core variable of the 
economic activity, its determinants and the role of investment, and particularly 
public investment, as a potential contributor. Growth theorists agree in principle 
that public and private investment plays a decisive role in the sense that it enhances 
the economy‟s productivity, particularly by driving an upward influence on 
technology and education, among other physical and societal variables. Public 
investment‟s particularity lays in the fact that it is sought to provide key 
infrastructural components, which theoretically constitute the fundamental basis for 
any economic activity. Regardless of the specific magnitude of its impact on GDP 
and productivity according to different empirical studies, a large part of the 
theoretical and empirical literature recognizes public investment to be a superior 
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determinant of economic growth. As an example, in the well-known Baxter & 
King‟s (1993) neoclassical model, public capital is typically modeled as an unpaid 
factor with a significant marginal product in the private sector production function. 
This implies that, besides from its “ordinary” effects like any economic agent‟s 
consumption, government can also provide a positive externality on the private 
inputs‟ productivity through public investment.  
However, the approach that one should adopt in order to produce a precise 
assessment of this externality remains blurry, as public investment offers goods and 
services that cannot be directly connected to private sector output. In other words, 
it is difficult to assess public capital‟s impact on productivity and output growth, 
since it would only indirectly affect them. This difficulty exists even when it comes 
to infrastructure investment expenditures, because the latter‟s impact on 
productivity takes a long time to be recognizable and the risk of losing track 
becomes quite important, which complicates the data assessment even more. 
The debate remains unfasten, starting from the Keynesian-Classical 
controversies, down to the divergent empirical findings regarding the very impact 
of public spending, particularly government investment, on GDP growth. Based on 
the different works reviewed in this paper, it would be difficult to definitely 
ascertain the extent of relationship between fiscal policy/public investment 
expenditures and the economic activity. A large number of empirical studies 
confirmed the existence of a significant upward influence of public investment on 
economic growth and, in some cases, on private investment. However, several 
authors found public capital to be of no avail when it comes to promoting output 
growth, and some even came up with the conclusion that public spending has a 
detrimental macroeconomic effect. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a certain number of rules-of-thumb that 
could help guide a country in the shaping of an effective public investment policy. 
Authors like Easterly &Rebelo (1993) and Warner (2014) defend that the 
differences in estimates of the extent of public investment‟s influence on output 
growth are most likely due to uncertainties around fiscal multipliers on the demand 
side and inefficiencies on the supply side
50
. Another strand of research papers sort-
of combines the different visions by linking the significance of public investment‟s 
impact on GDP growth, to various notions of efficiency. As a matter of fact, 
efficiency stands out as a transversal concept, whether through the reduction of 
corruption or investment projects selectivity –based on costs and macroeconomic 
reactivity, among other forms efficiency incarnates. Several of the papers discussed 
above present it as a decisive determinant of the significance of the influence of 
public investment on the economic activity. The overwhelming result is that 
relationships between investment (both private and public) and GDP growth are 
stronger in countries where public investment is more efficient. Gupta et al (2014) 
support this conclusion in the case of 52 developing and provide evidence that 
when public capital is adjusted for efficiency, i.e. the adequacy of projects 
selection and implementation, its impact as a contributor to growth increases in a 
statistically significant way, especially in low-income countries
51
. On the other 
hand, other economists, at the image of Berg et al (2015), take this question from a 
“transitional dynamics” perspective and argue that economies with sub-efficient 
public capital usually also have a rather small quantity of capital; therefore, it can 
still benefit from substantial returns to public and private investment compared to 
more efficient countries, which often happen to also have an abundant capital 
stock. 
As a consequence, public investment is likely to be more efficient in small and 
middle income countries where the capital to GDP ratio is usually the lowest. This 
could be explained by the fact that public investment supposedly provides 
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developing countries with the lacking infrastructures regarding logistics, 
transportation, education and public health services, which are considered as sine 
qua non preliminary conditions for any private investment in human or physical 
capital, hence it is generally non-substitutable and helps uplift economic growth 
and development. In other words, public investment could have a larger 
macroeconomic effect in the developing world compared to advanced economies, 
since there is a more important margin of improvement at the infrastructure level, 
among other development and economic variables, hence a low likelihood of 
public-private capital substitutability. The public-private investment substitutability 
plays a determinant role in this framework since it exacerbates the crowding out 
effect. The substitutability is more present in advanced economies than in 
developing ones, which could explain why the public investment multiplier effect 
is found to go up to 1.4 in middle income countries while it is weak –and even 
negative in some cases- in advanced economies [see Hemming et al (2002)]. 
Based on these different elements of analysis, it is possible to connect the dots 
and think of a plausible explanation for the relatively weak macroeconomic effect 
of public investment, i.e. when further public spending do not follow efficiency 
and profitability-based selectivity, its marginal productivity is likely to shrink as 
the crowding-out effect stays at a certain level. By the end of the process, the 
allegedly positive effect of public investment on output would have been partially 
or totally neutralized by the negative macroeconomic impact of crowding-out. The 
same effect is to be expected in the case where capital stock is very high compared 
to GDP, as returns generated by further investment would progressively diminish. 
In other words, public investment could be a significant determinant of economic 
growth, provided that governments take the aforementioned constraints into 
account. 
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